Patent evergreening: technological advancement and abusive commercial practices. Availability of essential medicine in the case of access to insulin by Radelli, Marta
QMLJ (2021) 2, 66 
DOI: 10.26494/QMLJ3941 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
Patent evergreening: technological advancement and abusive commercial 
practices. Availability of essential medicine in the case of access to insulin 
*Marta Radelli 
Abstract The article analyses problems caused by patent evergreening in the pharmaceutical 
industry, with a particular focus on access to insulin. It points out how abusive commercial 
practices prevent the most vulnerable to benefit from scientific developments of the modern world 
and evidence-based medicine. This article does not only examine crucial legal aspects, such as a 
coexistence of fundamental human rights and the TRIPS Agreement, but also considers the impact 
of the patent system’s procedural norms. Finally, the article argues how secondary patenting 
prevents the harmonisation of public interest and the enforcement of private rights, where 
safeguarding equal access to essential medicine is required. 
1. Introduction 
It is said that the “most important source of the economic value creation is a society’s 
ability to generate, exploit and share technological advances.”1 Although patents are usually 
claimed to boost innovation and improve people’s lives, they are currently the biggest barrier to 
access essential medicine.2 Moreover, it is argued that patent protection is not always necessary to 
drive incentive for some industries - especially when it comes to pharmaceutical giants.3 
Patent evergreening is a deceptive device in patent rights.4 The phenomenon, also referred 
to as “incremental patenting,”5 is accused of delaying the entry of cheaper, generic versions of 
medicines into the marketplace,6 by creating private monopolies which abuse the patent system 
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and affect vulnerable segments of society that are unable to afford essential drugs.7 The term 
“patent evergreening” may be used to label practices that extend the exclusive right of a patent 
holder by seeking trivial improvements or adjustments to a medicine.8 Although the literature does 
not give a clear definition of “evergreening”, and the term is still debatable,9 patent evergreening 
is an abuse of the patent system, causing serious damage to society at large.10 While in principle a 
patent should reward the inventor who shares the innovation with society, it is the process of 
enrichment at the expense of vulnerable persons that conflicts with the fundamental right to life 
and health.  
The obligatory patent protection for pharmaceuticals directly contributes to limiting access 
to medicine in most developing countries.11 Because of the mandatory nature to grant market 
exclusivity for drugs, the only power of authority to abolish barriers to access essential medicines 
vests in the states themselves. Although developing countries are worse off economically, they are 
being criticized for not easily allowing secondary patents.12 However, raising patentability 
standards is often the only solution to limit patent evergreening.13  
This article presents the relationship between secondary patents and access to medicine. 
Although the dispute is not novel, the purpose of this paper is to give new insights into an ongoing 
debate of the repercussions caused by a prolonged monopoly in the pharmaceutical industry. The 
article will stress that the state, as a guardian of fundamental rights, must give diabetics secure and 
safe means of approach to generic medicine. The discussion will concern not only how intellectual 
property rights may interfere with the right to health, but also how administrative procedures 
related to secondary patents and other forms of abusive evergreening processes contradict with 
access to essential medicine. 
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The paper will present not only the value, but also the consequences of technological 
advancement that result in abusive commercial practices together with secondary patenting. It will 
analyse the insulin affordability crisis in consideration of the problem of patent evergreening 
present in the pharmaceutical sector and underline how those processes create a barrier to equal 
access to medicine. In addition, the importance of administrative and procedural aspects of patent 
law regime in secondary patent grants will be examined. Finally, the author will demonstrate the 
power of governmental health care policies and international agreements in safeguarding the 
fundamental human right to health and life. 
2. The price of innovation 
Intellectual property rights are said to be a form of government regulation of the free 
market, which tries to improve the life of society by restricting the freedom of other people to do 
what they want with the work of their minds.14 Since developing a drug requires a large investment 
of time, as well as financial resources, and nevertheless is an uncertain process,15 the true and first 
inventors may be rewarded “an exclusive privilege” by being granted a patent.16 There is a 
common understanding that patents are essential assets in developing innovations and thus 
benefitting society by improvements in medicine, science or technology.17 Nonetheless, the notion 
is often criticized for depriving poorer individuals of having access to those improvements.18 The 
patent law regime is also blamed for unequal drug distribution, due to pharmaceutical companies’ 
unwillingness to properly balance the risks and benefits during the introduction of the new 
medicine into the market.19 
There are certain arguments in favour of granting patent rights which shall not be 
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undermined. Just like copyright “imposes taxes on the readers” to reward the writers,20 patents 
protect the inventor by offering 20 years of monopoly on the market. During this time, a patent 
holder may enrich himself from being the only supplier of that particular invention, and 
simultaneously, the state benefits from the disclosure of the innovation. However, medicines differ 
from other (technological) inventions as they need to be approved by a regulatory body and 
therefore do not immediately enter the marketplace.21 Because the process of medical review is 
time-consuming, pharmaceutical companies often try to seek patent protection when the market 
authorization process occurs.22 Due to the high volume and intensity of work put into the 
development of a drug, compensation in a form of market exclusivity is desirable in the scientific 
field.23   
Despite being granted market exclusivity for 20 years, enterprises are tempted to prolong 
their position by strategically aiming to achieve the “life cycle management” of a medicine through 
secondary patents.24 Since generic manufacturers can launch a biosimilar version of the drug as 
soon as its patent has expired, secondary patents result in restricting patients from receiving cheaper 
versions of essential medicine which they can afford. Maximizing the monopoly in this way 
typically occurs with best-selling drugs;25 for example, with drugs that are often used to treat 
conditions such as diabetes, arthritis or cancer.26 Secondary patents for which pharmaceutical 
companies file are often “disguised or artful” and they mostly focus on delivery profiles of a drug, 
its packaging, dosing rage or a new use for an old molecule.27  
Regardless of the fact that requirements such as novelty or inventive step should, in 
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principle, make secondary patent applications more troublesome to succeed,28 incremental 
patenting nonetheless takes place. Improperly harmonised patent law regime enables known 
substances and new compounds of an old drug to be protected, as the claims often relate to 
improved use of a particular medicine, concerning discoveries which occur while clinical trials 
take place. Although patents are said to promote dissemination of innovative knowledge, in 
countries such as the United States and Australia, secondary patenting is possible.29 Due to very 
low patentability requirements of inventive step and utility, negligible drug improvements may be 
monopolised.30 
Patents are likely to result in “welfare-reducing monopolistic pricing, licensing or standard-
setting behaviour”.31 For many years, pharmaceutical protection was not present in many countries 
as it was claimed that doing so would abuse vulnerable citizens.32 However, as the price of research 
and development increased in parallel with the risk accompanied with this process, pharmaceutical 
companies were eventually allowed to receive patent protection.33 It was the implementation of 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that made 
it compulsory for all its members to respect pharmaceutical patent enforcement.34 At the same 
time, it enabled developing countries to define standards of patentability independently, which 
resulted in the introduction of a more restrictive approach towards secondary pharmaceutical 
patents.35 The implementation of TRIPS enabled originator companies to file “first” secondary 
patents in jurisdictions of developing countries, as those secondary patents were of products that 
had already been patented in other states.36 Some drugs, for which the patent applications were 
filed in the 1990s, were unable to receive a primary patent there, and hence, granting secondary 
patents was the only type of protection that developing countries could give to innovators.37  
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Although TRIPS aimed to strengthen IP protection in between its members,38 the 
Agreement also claimed to primarily serve as a “reliable guide for the commercial and investment 
decisions of profit-maximizing firms”.39 Most TRIPS-compliant patent protection makes the 
majority of life-saving drugs unavailable, while delaying the competition of generic drugs and 
undermining local production.40 The importance of generic drugs is predominantly recognized by 
individuals who lack access to medicine. It is argued that if the quality of traditional patent granting 
procedures is decreased, it will have a greater impact on allowing low-quality secondary patents 
in developing countries.41 Although, understandably, safeguarding patent law is used as a tool for 
boosting technological advancement, an inability to provide equal healthcare distribution is a threat 
to citizens’ fundamental rights.42 The states are obliged by the right to health to enable every person 
to be as healthy as possible by meeting the four requirements: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality.43   
The problem of restricted access to medicines was firstly most prominently discussed when 
the South African government established legislation allowing the import and manufacture of 
generic versions of patented drugs.44 Since access to medicines is based on the affordability of the 
drugs, administrative procedures should assist in enabling the society to take advantage of the 
availability of the medicine. Consequently, generic versions of the drugs produced locally might 
eventually become one of the most fundamental factors fulfilling the right to health and enabling 
patients to access essential medicines without being proposed overpriced drugs which might have 
been evergreened for more than 20 years. 
3. Patent evergreening and technological advancement 
A fundamental justification for intellectual property rights has utilitarian roots,45 since 
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public disclosure of innovations enables the society to benefit when people conceive of new 
inventions.46 It might be said that scientific progress occurs as a product of exploiting ideas and 
developing innovations that have been shared with the public.47  
The “secondary patent” notion is typically used to refer to a particular claim type in 
pharmaceuticals.48  When the secondary patent prolongs market exclusivity without significant, 
usually therapeutic, improvement,49 it allows patent holders to increase the return on investment 
while simultaneously increasing the prices of the drug.50 Patent evergreening is thus criticized, as 
it is claimed that the secondary patent does not require as much research and investment as the 
primary one.51  
A typical example of patent evergreening practice may be observed in device patents being 
granted after the initial molecular substance has already obtained monopoly rights, strengthening 
the commercial position of companies by restricting generic drugs to enter into the competition. 
This results in an absence of a proportionate public benefit which subsequently undermines the 
initial utilitarian idea of granting monopoly rights to boost incentives and improve the quality of 
lives. The clinical value of the improvement is a vague point in patent device evergreening since 
it is possible to achieve the same therapeutic result when administering the same drug with another 
device.52 Nevertheless, in some cases, a new device does improve the therapeutic benefit of the 
medicine.53  Pharmaceutical companies find a way to take advantage of their position in the market 
by issuing devices that bear several patents to conveniently enjoy market exclusivity for decades.54 
 
46 Peter S Menell, Mark A Lemley, & Robert P Merges, ‘INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
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Property Organization, World Trade Organization; 2012:56 
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3.1. Secondary pharmaceutical patenting 
Patent “evergreening” is considered a rather pejorative term.55 The biggest controversy 
regarding patent evergreening lies in the idea that the state should only grant a monopoly in return 
for an equitable public benefit.56  The malpractice of patent evergreening is not only negligible in 
improving the standard of care,57 but it also delays and restricts the entry of generic versions of 
drugs on the market.58 It has been argued that secondary patents are also often of lower “quality” 
than primary patents, and although they may lack strong novelty and non-obviousness claims, they 
nevertheless efficiently restrict competition.59 Although there is no specific distinction between 
primary and secondary patents in patent law, evergreening is nonetheless regarded as an unethical 
practice.60 
One of the most famous cases where patent evergreening was successfully tackled was 
Novartis v India.61 India was one of the developing countries that successfully put in place specific 
restrictions against evergreening using TRIPS flexibilities. India introduced section 3(d) under the 
India Patent Act, where new forms of old substance would only be eligible for patent protection if 
the applicant could establish “increased efficacy” of a product.62 The section as a subject of 
controversy was challenged in the Novartis case, which revolutionized the way evergreening is 
seen. Indian Patents Act and its section 3(d) was introduced to disallow “incremental innovation” 
and to mitigate unnecessary monopolies being sought by pharmaceutical giants.63 To be truly 
considered as novel, innovation must meet the requirement of efficacy, which is explained as a 
therapeutic effect on the body which is “rightly and reasonably expected to show” how the drug is 
effective in healing disease.64 
The Novartis decision is believed to have had a great impact on access to medicine, as it 
reminded other nations that “making available life-saving drugs is a constitutional obligation of 
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the state”.65 However, while it illustrated that the misuse of IP rights by evergreening must be 
tackled, the decision was also controversial for seemingly having a detrimental impact on the 
importance of recognition of R&Ds (research and developments) and discoveries.66 The Indian 
judgment was therefore both praised and criticized. Medicines Sans Frontiers applauded the 
Novartis decision, claiming that it allowed Indian citizens to get treatment with Gleevec, which 
would have been impossible had the drug received secondary patent protection.67 Furthermore, it 
encouraged other countries to follow India’s example to fight pharmaceutical evergreening.68 
Those opposing the Novartis decision claim that the Madras court erred in ruling that efficacy only 
has a therapeutic value, arguing that long-life stability is indeed an improvement in efficacy.69 It 
is also argued that incremental innovation should be protected, as the world through this could 
experience a “gradual move towards breakthrough inventions”, which was a fundamental feature 
of current medical progress.70 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Novartis court was not 
against patent law, but rather, it considered public health as superior to the patentability of trivial 
advancement.71 
Since the price of drugs is one of the major barriers in accessibility of essential medicine, 
developing countries are particularly at risk of disabling said access for their citizens due to the 
increased monopoly of pharmaceutical giants and the lack of manufacturing and transportation 
abilities for generic versions. In emerging economies, the market value of innovation may be small, 
and consequently, the incentives to invest in R&Ds may probably not exist at all.72 The 
introduction of legal provisions aiming to hamper patent evergreening and secondary patenting is 
therefore vital to protect such emerging economies from “supra-competitive prices” of drugs, 
arising due to restricted competition and lack of generic alternatives.73 
4. Insulin affordability crisis 
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Nearly 63% of deaths globally occur as a consequence of non-communicable diseases, 
such as cancer, chronic respiratory or cardiovascular diseases, or diabetes.74 Further, over 14 
million of these patients die prematurely, between the ages of 30 and 70. This directly affects the 
economy of low- and middle-income countries, resulting in increased poverty.75 
Historically, an insulin patent was sold for $1,76 hoping to ease access for those in need. For 
every person suffering from diabetes, insulin, which is a hormonal substance, is indispensable to 
survive. Nevertheless, it is a “prohibitively expensive essential medicine”.77 Despite insulin being 
considered a pharmaceutical that is of priority for a fundamental health-care system,78 it has been 
estimated that in 2016 over 50 million people all over the world lack access to insulin.79 The three 
giants: Sanofi, Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk,80 control 99% of the insulin market.81 This means that 
only a small number of generic drugs are allowed to break in to lower the price of insulin. By 
making improvements to their insulin drug or corresponding devices, these giants are securing 
their place in the market. As the American Diabetes Association (ADA) report establishes, the price 
of insulin in the US has nearly tripled in the last few years.82 Patients who cannot afford to buy the 
necessary insulin vials try to skip or ration their doses, and are often subject to serious health 
complications, frequently leading to premature deaths.83 Some intentionally induce diabetic 
ketoacidosis in pursuance of getting insulin from hospital emergency rooms.84  
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commitment.html> Accessed 25 June 2020. 
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One of the more recent insulin affordability crises experienced by a developed country is 
happening in the United States. Its complexity lies in the fact that every individual has a different 
health support plan and insurance, and the pharmacies supplying patients are charging them in 
accordance with their health insurance coverage. If a patient lacks health insurance for medication, 
the drug is sold for its purchase price, and most frequently, with a mark-up.85 The degree of 
negotiating power differs between stakeholders in the “insulin supply chain”, which further 
complicates the process.86 Diabetics have to bear the burden of continuous price amendments, as 
if one insulin manufacturer increases the price for their drug, others do the same.87 On the contrary, 
in the European Union, the governments act as benefit managers and directly negotiate medicine 
prices with pharmaceutical companies, which seems to be a more effective approach.88 
Due to the drastic increase of insulin prices (by even 353% - e.g., a NovoLog vial),89 many 
stakeholders, pharmacists and patients asked for increased transparency of insulin pricing 
methods.90  It is claimed that due to lack of transparency, manufacturers are “at a disadvantage” in 
setting the price for insulin products, as they are unaware of the negotiations happening between 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) and health plan insurance.91 After the ADA Working Group 
investigated this inquiry, they determined that it is “unclear… how the dollars flow and how much 
each intermediary profits”, as the negotiations are extremely confidential.92 It has been deducted 
that although insulin manufacturers directly control the list price of insulin, these are also PBMs 
that have the biggest negotiating power, as they determine which type of insulin is available in 
particular insurance plans.93 
Currently, it is more difficult for a generic drug treating non-communicable diseases, such 
as diabetes, to be accessible than a generic drug that treats communicable diseases.94 Although the 
 
85 ADA (n 82) 1300. 
86 ibid. 
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US has a significant problem with access to insulin as a wealthy state, it should not be forgotten 
that the majority of patients suffering from diabetes live in low- or middle-income countries, which 
adds to frustration associated with the insulin affordability dilemma.95  
4.1. Barriers to equal access 
It might be suggested that once the idea of utilitarianism faces the fatal consequences 
resulting from the existence of barriers to accessibility of drugs, it is problematic to determine a 
basis for a “pre-political right” to intellectual property.96 One of the most recent extreme 
evergreening examples is the case of Sanofi’s product – Lantus. Due to 74 patents, most of 
which were filed after the drug received market authorization in 2000, its monopoly has been 
extended to further 37 years.97 The fact that Sanofi filed 1.5 times more patents in the US than it 
filed in the EPO,98 seems to be a drastic American patent system failure. The primary patent for 
Lantus expired in 2015, which after receiving regulatory approval by the FDA in 2000, gave 
Sanofi a long time to enjoy the market exclusivity for at least 15 years.99 
The issue with the generic version of insulin lies in the fact that most biosimilar 
companies face struggles with accessing the market, as the original companies are also often 
tempted to issue their generic version of insulin. Furthermore, there is almost no generic 
competition for human insulin in the US.100 Supposedly, providing access to insulin generic 
versions could prevent breaching the fundamental right to health and life. This argument may be 
supported by the fact that the insulin price is able to drop by at least half, if more than two 
generic companies are willing to manufacture the drug on the market.101 Hence, competition may 
be regarded as a vital ground for reducing the price of life-saving medicine.  
Any innovation in pharmaceutical strategies is undoubtedly essential for people with 
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diabetes, as it may lower some side effects or complications of the disease itself.102 American 
Diabetes Association claims that to encourage innovation, the best option would be to “link 
reimbursement to value”, creating a “value-based insurance design”.103 After delivering their 
research, ADA claims to be particularly worried by the complexity of the system.104 Biosimilar or 
generic insulins are not sufficiently popular on the market, and because there are too few of them, 
ADA states they are unlikely to lower the price of insulin.105 Hence, if there were more biosimilar 
insulin versions on the market, they would be more likely to address the problem of affordability. 
In ADA’s report, it has also been noted that instead of providing analogue insulin, it would be 
more appropriate to make “human insulin more available to uninsured diabetics”.106 
Pharmaceutical companies underline that patent applications filed prior to market circulation  
do not constitute abuse, since they are based on a massive investment of comprehensive research 
and development of the drug.107 As a response to such allegations, the Initiative for Medicines, 
Access and Knowledge (I-MAK) has procured an examination of patent applications filed after 
Lantus was approved in 2000. This examination noted that 95 per cent (69 out of total 74) 
constituted secondary patent applications as they were filed after the USFDA gave Lantus the 
market authorization.108 As a consequence, biosimilar manufacturers must be aware of the existing 
secondary patents and their implications, as those hamper the generic versions of the drug to enter 
into the market,109 delaying competition110  and eventually impacting the medicine’s pricing, as 
well as its end users’ health. It was reported that Sanofi increased the price of Lantus by 18% each 
year from 2012 to 2016, and the American health insurance companies’ (Medicare or Medicaid) 
spent on person increased by 89%.111 
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Barriers to access to insulin comprise of multiple factors, most of which come down to 
international and national restrictions. Unfortunately, the most price-influential mechanisms to 
deal with exhaustion of patent rights are the national patent laws,112 which may nevertheless 
hamper the introduction of generic drug manufacturers by the domestic laws regulating the test 
data.113 Because of the issues related to the lack of access to insulin worldwide, pharmaceutical 
companies cannot be safeguarded by an allegation that they are unaware of the problems of 
vulnerable patients. As a result of the bad reputation of insulin manufacturers, Novo Nordisk 
started their own accessibility programme through which it has treated over 2.9 million patients 
who could not afford human insulin at its usual industrial price.114 Similarly, Sanofi has launched 
the “Healthcare for All” sustainability and quality action,115 and Eli Lilly has started its 
responsibility programme.116 
Although most patents on insulin are soon to be expired, patents on insulin delivery 
devices pose a major risk to insulin accessibility nowadays.117 Patents on devices, such as insulin 
pens, outlast medical ingredient patents. Evergreening of devices shall not be considered as a 
separate topic, as competing with generic manufacturers through creating a collective relationship 
of patenting drugs and devices, and thereby forcing prolonged market exclusivity, also puts 
biosimilars off the market. Most recently, Mylan won a patent battle with Sanofi, where two 
device patents were invalidated, enabling the generic version of insulin glargine to be brought as 
a more affordable version of Sanofi’s best-selling drug Lantus.118  Device evergreening also 
poses a growing risk of impairing the patent system by stimulating most patentable improvements 
rather than the most genuine and beneficial ones.119 A good example establishing this issue may 
be Combivent Respimat ® which original patents on active compounds were granted in the 
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1970s and, by being attached to the medicine’s inhalers were respectively prolonged for over 58 
years.120 Trivial improvements can be observed with diabetics’ delivery devices, such as Novo 
Nordisk ® insulin aspart pens, having solely their mechanical features changed, usually bearing 
no efficacy or therapeutic improvement.121 
Besides delivering innovative and allegedly improved modes of drug injection, device 
innovation implies the growth of prices, as an increased introduction of prefilled and cartridge 
devices is more expensive than vials.122 Other barriers having global implications are exchange 
rates, since most medicines are purchased in US dollars, and national policies such as an 
effective distribution system and government health expenditure.123 The concept of “security of 
supply” applicable to insulin seems to be a prominent option for states to introduce a further step 
to ensure insulin being available for those in particular need.124 The notion is based on equipping 
the state’s reserves in supplies of a particular material, such as oil or food, from various 
sources.125 Security of supply of medicine has been determined by the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) by three factors of supply: uninterrupted, sustainable and affordable quality 
medicine.126 These components applied to the security of supply of insulin amount to, inter alia, 
diversity of supply, an expenditure of insulin, stability of prices, access and equity, affordability, 
and intellectual property management.127 National governments are therefore strongly 
encouraged to seek to amend their patent laws to grant a monopoly for only those inventions 
genuinely meeting the benchmarks of novelty and inventive step,128 or issue compulsory 
licenses, when necessary, to ensure access to essential medicine.129 
5. Playing the patent game130 
Absence of generic competition not only empowers the oligopoly of pharmaceutical giants, 
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but also directly impacts customers by creating a solid barrier for the right to health enforcement. 
Prohibitive drug prices are mostly the result of strong intellectual property protection.131 In 
consequence, commercial medicines may become totally unaffordable in the future.132 Most 
international policies and agreements aim to intensify the legitimacy of patent protection rather 
than to recognize access to medicine promulgation, although concerns are being raised by 
countries with both emerging and emerged economies.133 This raises the question of why abusive 
secondary patenting is not expressly prohibited if the society is facing so many obstacles to get the 
drug. It would be difficult to restrict secondary patenting as patents in general are the best assets 
to prompt risky research, but also because they require innovators to disclose their findings and 
thereby benefit the rest of the society.134  
However, patent law regimes in some countries do impose penalties against 
evergreening,135 which may inspire other states to do the same. The WHO encouraged countries 
to amend their national legislations to enable universal access to affordable pharmaceuticals and 
promulgate the existence of a fundamental right to health.136 Although the cycle is designed to 
empower innovation and to eventually benefit us all,137 findings regarding secondary patenting, if 
any, show the opposite results.138 
It is claimed that the only social responsibility and morality of any business is to increase 
its profits,139 and evergreening practices are occurring as a kind of response to market incentives.140 
This is often supported by the infamous Lockean labour theory of value, which promotes labour, 
instead of mutual consent, as the grounds of ownership.141 The economic value of patented 
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technological information derives from the fact that it may be used in the industry for commercial 
purposes.142 Furthermore, patents are important assets in correcting the market failure, since the 
manufacturers using the innovation without incurring costs of R&Ds will have an advantage over 
firms that had to invest substantial intellect, capital and time.143 As long as the company maximizes 
its prices, its profits are also maximized, and there is no need to support the enterprise by non-
market-based income, which eventually is said to exclude the actual losses to the society.144 Based 
on this concept, society is tempted to value work for its own sake, which may lead to justifying 
intellectual property as the “moral end” in itself, disregarding evidence proving how it affects the 
world.145  
Pharmaceutical companies sustain their monopoly not only through patenting active 
compounds, molecule modifications or upgrading specialized delivery systems, but also by 
attaining their dominance within the therapeutic class or reference of the product.146 Filing multiple 
patents on different aspects of a drug is also a common evergreening practice.147 Furthermore, 
firms also focus on legal protection based on trade marks, together with differentiation of branding, 
exclusive distribution, as well as differential pricing and product strategies.148 Still, some argue 
that although the public benefits most from lower prices, companies are expected to take up practices 
allowing them to balance costs paid for the R&D, which may reach up to $1.4bn, with their return, 
requiring at least $0.5bn sales.149 
As a counter-argument to secondary patenting critics, it may be said that inventions cannot 
always be planned. Some might start from a discovery that may, together with research and 
development, solve the problems of previously unrecognized therapeutic needs. Therefore, one 
cannot predict the need to claim a secondary patent for the same thing in the future. Besides 
investing large amounts of money in research and development, innovator companies must face 
marketing approval of one single product, selected from thousands of those investigated by the 
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developer.150 
Although 20 years of trumping competitive generic companies should be sufficient for 
innovators to recover after such a huge investment, the strategies that they procure to maintain 
exclusivity are still very aggressive.151 Most national health systems are based on the assumption 
that the country shall ease access to medicine for the individuals.152 Emerging states do not always 
impose price controls, giving citizens of poorer countries another obstacle of increased drug 
pricing to overcome.153 Because wealthy countries are financially contributing to help poorer states 
to provide drugs for their society in most cases, there is a common consideration that the issue of 
drug pricing shall be considered by every state.154 
Evergreening can also happen in forms other than claiming a secondary patent for the same 
drug. It may occur when the pharmaceutical giant is launching its improved generic version of a 
branded drug and significantly decreases its price.155 Another form of evergreening is switching a 
medicine to an Over the Counter (OTC) drug, allowing the company to enhance their monopoly 
by directly advertising their product to consumers, and consequently minimizing generic 
competition which the public is not aware of.156 Pharmaceutical giants may launch a successor 
drug, a blockbuster, with a different name and trade dress, to prolong their monopoly and again to 
undermine the generic competition.157 
Innovators also try to extend the monopoly by switching the drug’s route of administration 
by Novel Drug Delivery Systems.158 Both the European Union’s and the United States’ laws have 
legal provisions to protect combinations of two or more drugs. This is another form of evergreening 
by which companies release a soon-to-go-off patented drug with another one, to tackle “closely 
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associated medical conditions”.159 Biosimilars are often the only hope for poorer citizens as their 
prices might be significantly lower than the branded drug,160 and hence their presence among 
pharmaceutical giants is desired. The search to find an equilibrium for limiting and imposing both 
private and public rights is challenging. In making this assessment, one shall determine whether 
patentability standards and requirements might be a notion that, if altered, could bring more 
excellence and balance in the modern world. 
5.1. Facing aggressive patent practices 
25 % of global health spending is caused by pharmaceuticals.161 Since generic companies 
are producing biosimilar versions of drugs that have already been researched and developed by the 
original innovator, they can offer medicines with significantly lower prices. It is argued that 
original companies are taking unfair competitive approaches because generic companies are 
“reducing the market share of the branded drugs” by offering lower prices for poorer consumers.162 
This reasoning is not deeply convincing as the existence of a variety of competing undertakings is 
guaranteeing a higher quality of products released and lower prices on the market share, and if 
competitors were enabled to produce biosimilars, they would immediately lower the prices of those 
medicines by even 70-80%.163 For that reason, an accurate national procurement policy is a crucial 
device in supplying the quality drugs at the lowest prices possible.164 
The approach to competition differs from state to state. In the United States, generic 
companies are encouraged to challenge the creator’s patent, basing their claim on the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, which was enacted to ensure a balance being achieved between generic 
and innovator companies.165 It is claimed that the 180-day period of market exclusivity granted 
for a generic manufacturer is “a recognition of the public interest” to reduce monopolies created 
by parent companies.166 Generics can also rely on the America Invents Act of 2011 which was 
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meant to “fight abusive patenting and cut healthcare costs”.167 Nevertheless, the US regulatory 
system visibly favours existing insulin manufacturers, which makes it more burdensome for 
biosimilars to compete.168  
In contrast, it is difficult to find provisions addressing aggressive patent practices in 
European law. The European Union’s 2014 Action Plan on the enforcement of IP rights aims to 
strengthen the position of intellectual property, which was said to be a direct incentive for growth, 
and fight against counterfeiting.169 The European Commission highlighted the importance of 
enhancing the EU’s industrial competitiveness through IP rights, so that  companies “generate 
returns for their investment in knowledge”.170 The internal market of the European Union is 
protected by the establishment of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) that restrict unfair competition and the abuse of a dominant position. 
Some refer to Article 102 as the article corresponding to the wrongs of evergreening. However, 
this provision is ineffective as patent laws are governed nationally, rather than by the 
Community law.171 Consequently, EU laws are said to be too lenient and insufficient to tackle 
evergreening.172  
5.2. Attempts to tackle incremental patenting by the implementation of 
TRIPS flexibilities 
Several emerging countries have previously tried to prevent pharmaceutical patenting in 
their citizens' best interest. As mentioned above, TRIPS flexibilities were tested in the Novartis v 
Union of India case, which was said to be an example of a state’s interest to protect the right to 
health.  However, the majority of restrictions that were introduced to tackle patent evergreening 
were found to be ineffective, as there is no remarkable difference in grants for primary patents and 
secondary patents in neither Argentina, Brazil, Japan, nor the US and Europe.173 It has also been 
proven that it is easier to obtain a secondary patent in Europe (EU) and in the US, rather than in 
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Argentina, Brazil, Japan or India.174 Undoubtedly, national differences in patent systems’ 
characteristics can play a crucial role since not all states file their application under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty.175 The data shows Argentina as the country that has most successfully 
observed its secondary patenting restrictions, as the grant rate for secondary patents is much lower 
than for primary applications.176 As evidence suggests, neither Brazil’s nor India’s policies are very 
effective.177  
Although TRIPS aimed to harmonize patent law, the evidence does not support this 
view.178 Brazil seemed to have become a country that successfully dealt with the new patent 
granting lawsuit implemented by TRIPS and its flexibilities, despite the fact that Brazil’s 
differences in primary and secondary patent grants are currently almost identical.179 To tackle the 
problem of pharmaceutical patent evergreening, the new laws were introduced together with 
ANVISA – the Ministry of Health surveillance agency whose “Prior Consent” was required to 
grant patents on drugs.180 ANVISA took an approach to limit secondary patents and developed its 
examination guidelines.181 Although the Prior Consent system has been revised, pharmaceutical 
patents must still be approved by both ANVISA and the Brazilian patent office (INPI).182 
Similarly, Argentina allowed pharmaceutical products to be patentable from 2000.183 In 
2012 the new guidelines introduced by the Argentinian patent office directed examiners to dismiss 
a vast majority of secondary patent application claims for pharmaceutical products. A more 
restrictive approach taken by Argentina is noticeable, and does not seem to be complex, as the 
policy only instructs patent examiners to reject secondary patents using usual patentability 
criteria.184 This approach suggests that administrative procedures is the most effective tool in 
tackling secondary patenting. In contrast, Mexico fails to observe flexibilities, and the consequence 
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of its wide margin of patentability results in one of the highest prices of drugs in Latin America.185  
Since the prices of pharmaceuticals in the Philippines have started to become one of the 
most expensive in Southeast Asia, the country has decided to implement TRIPS flexibilities for 
the sake of public health and accessibility of cheaper medicines.186 Following the example of 
India’s patent law and the Novartis decision, the Philippines was motivated to prescribe Section 
22 of the Republic Act No 8293 (following Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act) restricting 
“mere discovery of a new form or new property of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy” from being patentable.187  
The differences in grant patents are based on the features of national patent system policies 
in developing countries.188 The US and Europe established the highest grant rates for secondary 
patents, whereas Brazil and Argentina had the lowest grant rates,189 although it is claimed that in 
developing countries “formal rules are often not consistently enforced”.190 In India, the vast 
majority of secondary applications were refused on conventional patentability grounds, and it is 
suggested that although they cited Section 3(d), they might have been rejected even in the absence 
of the relevant secondary application restriction policy.191 The study concerning Brazil establishes 
that it is not always rejection that causes the grant rate to decrease, but rather withdrawals due to 
applicants’ negligence and inadequate fee payments before the examination process takes effect.192 
Furthermore, it was proven that the Prior Consent rejections are uncommon.193 
However, the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities also enabled other countries to 
introduce arrangements allowing opposition or filing observations by the third parties.194 A pre-
grant opposition procedure is established in Australia, where opposition on the patentability 
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requirements can be done by anyone.195 The pre-grant opposition regime is also prosperous in 
extracting voluntary licenses which, when enforced, may significantly lower the price of a drug.196 
It is not sufficient to merely introduce policies aiming to limit secondary patenting claims, but  
other procedural aspects must also be considered.197 Due to many additional difficulties that 
developing countries face, TRIPS flexibilities offered by the patent system may be the only solution 
to tackle monopoly and unequal access to essential drugs. Although there is little evidence that 
attempts of developing countries to “curb” the grant of secondary patents are effective,198 
administrative and procedural features of patent systems must be taken into account when aiming 
to understand how the patent system functions, what the impacts of patent policies are, and how 
to prevent abusive secondary patenting strategies.199 
6. Private rights and public goods – in search of equilibrium 
The transition process of a new drug into its generic version is slow and results in 
diminishing patients’ welfare.200 The example of the insulin crisis is a clear representation of the 
state’s attitude and responsibility towards patients’ well-being, as well as the power of 
pharmaceutical firms establishing their private rights. Some claim that rather than patent 
exclusivity, it is the national regulatory environment that poses the main threat to insulin 
accessibility.201  Hence, the price of insulin being regarded as a “prohibitively expensive essential 
medicine”,202 may be set by IP holders in response to the “complex regulatory environment 
surrounding biological drugs”.203  
Pharmaceutical companies often claim that patents are the exclusive stimulus to invest in 
drug development.204 The method of filing secondary patents for medical products seem to be 
exclusively fair for R&D teams’ reimbursement. Accordingly, regulatory costs constitute a major 
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obstacle for biosimilar manufacturers to enter the market, which results in high drug prices to 
recoup themselves after costly clinical trials.205 Existing insulin producers are also rarely subject 
to strict regulatory oversight, enabling them to issue their own versions of biosimilars, which are 
often only slightly cheaper than the original medicine206 and make it difficult for other 
manufacturers to compete with the giants. 
Adjusting administrative and procedural aspects of the patent law regime to balance private 
and public rights is burdensome. The regime is justified by a belief that pharmaceutical companies 
should involve the right to eliminate the competition from making use of a patented invention for 
a limited time, to recur the costs of R&Ds.207 When an old debate relating to restrictions posed to 
the accessibility of essential medicine is raised, the opposition argues that patents do not restrict 
patients of elemental choices, as patients are not forced to stick to improved versions of their drugs, 
but are allowed to choose the cheaper, not upgraded version of the medicine.208 Consequently, it is 
claimed that well-designed patent systems already deal with some types of evergreening,209 which 
do not pose a threat to human beings’ lives. It is further disputed that patents should not be regarded 
as a monopoly, but rather as exclusive rights, because the “built-in” balances and checks within 
the regime, such as compulsory licenses and permitted use schemes, are designed to prevent abuse 
of patents.210 Although these mechanisms are enforceable, abuse of patentability bar, especially 
novelty, very frequently occur by marginal modifications made to an invention.211  
EU and US patent term extension provisions are said to be “rather restrictive”, as legal 
provisions in some cases allow companies to restore investors' funds and extend patent term 
protection by a small period.212 Furthermore, patents are allowed to be challenged which could 
accelerate generic versions to enter the market.213 Post-grant opposition is available at the EPO in 
the European Union, and in the US the Hatch-Waxman Act provides Abbreviated New Drug 
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Application (ANDA) for generic bioequivalents, to enable them to reach the market.214 
Nevertheless, there are still some concerns regarding ANDA’s efficacy - if a potential patent 
opposition claim is successful, a patent may either expire or a duopoly may be created by two 
firms existing in the market.215 
In 2013, WHO issued the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases from 2013 until 2020, where it called for developing health equity 
and accessibility to essential medicines through full use of TRIPS flexibilities.216 The Members 
were encouraged to adopt evidence-informed strategies, such as including drugs on essential 
medicines lists, regressive mark-up schemes and controlling wholesale to ensure affordable access 
to essential medicines.217 Furthermore, they were involved to promote the use of safe, quality and 
affordable medicine including generic drugs.218 Also, to reduce the price paid by the patient and 
improve access to medicines, various programmes were created to incent generic drugs by 
encouraging pharmacists and medical practitioners to dispense and prescribe generic versions of 
drugs.219 Still, restricted access to insulin experienced by many diabetics around the world is only 
a sole example among others. 
The UDHR 1948 and the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights highlight the importance of the right to health which is crucial for every human being. 
Access to medicine is one of the most important aspects of fulfilling this right, as a third of the 
global population cannot enjoy it.220 The debates have always focused on infectious diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, but not necessarily on non-commutable diseases (NCD) such as 
diabetes. Still, issues preventing insulin from being available to every diabetic not only focus on 
price, but also cover distribution, governmental policies and the creation of a new health system.221 
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dropped significantly over the past years, its access is still an issue for many.223 Certainly, only 
states can be pursued to comply with international provisions and be liable for human rights 
violations, such as the socio-economic human right to health. At the same time, businesses cannot 
be deprived of their fundamental rights to development; and patent owners, to benefit from 
inventions. Still, the extent of the problem of insulin inaccessibility is illustrated by examples of 
hospitals which have started to formulate plans to produce their own biosimilars,224 and projects, 
such as The Open Insulin Project, which aims to increase competition in the insulin market.225 
While pharmaceutical giants argue that secondary patents are the only possibility for them 
to recur their investment costs, it shall be noted that many R&Ds are, in fact, funded by 
governments, by using public money. The new coronavirus vaccine is a great example of “global 
public goods” being administered to tackle a disease.226 Not only had the UK government 
sponsored R&Ds of the COVID-19 vaccine at the University of Oxford, but it has also 
implemented compulsory licenses to ensure that both therapeutic drugs and vaccines are easily, 
cheaply and widely accessible, as soon as possible, which was strongly recommended by the report 
released by the International Trade Committee.227  
The problem associated with the production of insulin is that there is too little evidence to 
ensure that most insulin giants are getting grants for R&Ds from public funds. Had this been the 
case, the financial value of absurdly overpriced and over-patented insulin would have an 
opportunity to dramatically decrease. Privately, pharmaceutical giants, such as Novo Nordisk, Eli 
Lilly and Sanofi, can play the patent game without respecting fundamental human rights. Although 
differential pricing is said to be fundamental to the business’ moral model,228 the catastrophic 
effects of controlling insulin market shares by the oligopoly are very likely to deepen.229 This also 
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leads to issues of so-called “entrepreneurial science”, which praises the risk-taking entrepreneurs 
that “interconvert the knowledge and wealth”.230 Biotech companies are being recognized for their 
contribution in producing drugs using complicated recombinant DNA techniques, despite the fact 
that this method had initially been developed by academics.231 Since the success story of 
entrepreneurial science is often accompanied by the company’s products and patents, one does not 
question occasional entrepreneurial thefts that often happen within in this industry.232  
It may be suggested that diabetics are being forgotten in this dispute. Had the essential 
medicines been researched, developed, manufactured and sold by the public institutions, public 
interest would have been observed.233 A model where the state funds the majority of R&Ds may 
result in allowing generic companies to compete and enter the market more easily, and public 
entities would be subject to transparency laws, making private pharmaceuticals more 
transparent.234 As a consequence, the fundamental human right to health and life would have a 
lesser chance of being undermined. 
7. Conclusion 
There is no other area where market and non-market functioning is subject to as many 
conflicts as in case of conflict between pharmaceuticals and patients in need.235 There is an 
indisputable need to ensure access to medicine for all patients in both developing and developed 
countries. At the same time, protection of intellectual property rights shall not be put aside. 
Although it is immaterial how much time, effort and money has been invested in research and 
development, there still exists a risk of a drug being unsuccessfully put into circulation. Furthermore, 
it is claimed that due to regulatory procedures being too complex and time-consuming, the “patent 
clock” starts ticking in the early development process of the medicine.236 Innovator companies 
increased their aggressive evergreening practices to reimburse the costs invested in drug 
development, forgetting about the humanitarian approach and especially, about their role in 
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addressing complicated diseases. 
It is understandable for innovators to expect solid compensation for their hard work, 
however, unreasonably procuring secondary patent applications and maintaining monopoly for as 
long as possible indeed impair the entry of cheaper, generic drugs on the market. TRIPS is 
frequently blamed as the instrument because of which its Member States are obliged to grant 
patents.237 Although there is much criticism against TRIPS, countries acknowledge that 
abandoning the agreement (and the WTO) would be a step leading to genuinely distressing trade 
relations with the rest of the world.238 
States’ struggles to hamper secondary patent applications have been analysed to understand 
what enabled one to get into the “black box” of patent examination procedures in developing 
and developed countries. As learned from examples of patent grants in Brazil and India, there are no 
lower grants for secondary patents than for primary ones. Instead, these states give applicants more 
time to reconsider whether their applications are important enough, and of sufficiently high quality, 
leading them to eventually abandon the application.239 However, the most successful state in 
tackling the pharmaceutical evergreening was Argentina, where patent examiners were taught to 
assess secondary patent applications precisely with the original patentability criteria. 
After conscientious interpretation of the findings enclosed in this paper, the most obvious 
recommendation to ease the access to essential medicine, and in particular to insulin, would be 
primarily to revise patentability requirements for secondary patents. The most vital role in securing 
the market share from irrationally prolonged exclusivity is the “inventiveness” requirement. It is 
claimed that if this patentability bar was raised, patients would experience a decrease in drug prices 
in 20 years through widened competition of biosimilars or generic drugs on the market.240 In patent 
law regime, both for primary and secondary applications, a level of inventiveness is not recognized 
as a requirement - the invention might be either a “breakthrough or an incremental step”.241 It has 
also been suggested that the pre-grant opposition system which is used by states such as Australia, 
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and the USPTO in trademark registration, might be a prominent idea to enable third parties to file 
opposition while the initial patent application is still under review.242 
The infamous example of the Novartis case in India establishes that states can face 
pharmaceutical giants and review patentability requirements to protect the poorest from 
inaccessibility to life-saving medicines. India, as well as other emerging countries that are taking 
the opportunity to use TRIPS flexibilities, are criticized for not enforcing intellectual property 
rights, claiming that it restricts companies from benefiting and economically advancing.243 India 
is being treated as an IP offender by the US and is being criticised by the EU for its decision to 
restrict patent evergreening. These approaches have also been criticized by the pharmaceutical 
industry as unfair obstacles to be rewarded for their inventions.244 
It is claimed that “affordability is impacted by purchasing power”.245 Therefore, the broad 
examination highlights that the knowledge of how medicines are preserved from competition shall 
be widely recognised.246  Since patent law most frequently is an international barrier in accessing 
medicine, enhancing national healthcare policies and strengthening the health systems would be a 
promising step towards improving insulin affordability. Although the pharmaceutical industry is 
usually private, expanding public investment to insulin R&Ds would ensure more transparency 
and could commit to wider responsibility towards patients suffering from non-communicable 
diseases. 
Safeguarding equitable access to quality medicine shall be an elementary component for 
all, and with the increase of diabetes, adopting security of supply of insulin must be supported by 
the promotion of local production, generic competition and diversity of suppliers, as well as 
harmonization of regulations.247 There is an indisputable need to adopt appropriate measures to 
address unmet patients’ needs by imposing an obligation on governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to increase affordability programmes, as restricted access to essential medicine is  
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observed not only in low- and middle- but also in high-income settings.248 If any state considers 
fighting abusive secondary patenting, it would first need to admit that patent evergreening does 
exist, define the patent evergreening term on their own and, subsequently, work on regulation, as 
well as administrative aspects of patent law improvements. 
Addressing the problems caused by patent evergreening includes the continuous debate on 
balancing inalienable human rights and the recognition of private rights. It has been argued that 
strong barriers to access to medicine still exist, with secondary patenting being one of those that 
globally affects pricing, distribution and lack of competition in the market. Patent evergreening 
does exist in the insulin industry and is frequently present in device evergreening. The oligopoly 
occurring as a result of practices procured by the pharmaceutical giants controlling the insulin 
market, restricts access to insulin and impacts the quality of lives of many vulnerable patients who 
live in low- or middle-income countries, or those citizens of high-income states who rely on their 
insurance package rather than their government. In any case, the value of human life and health is 
being underestimated and immediate change is required to enhance access to essential medicine, 
especially for those patients whose needs are currently unmet. 
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